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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to propose a new framework for structuring contract types and 
payment methods. Concerning procurement contracts, the first important new feature of this 
framework is a stepwise structure with three main steps in the contract design: (1) what will 
be procured—should the contract only include construction, or should it include both 
construction and operation/maintenance (2) who will do the detailed design of the premise 
and (3) how many contractors will the client use? The second important new feature of this 
framework is that both step 2 and step 3 include a continuum of alternatives. Concerning 
payment methods, the new framework is primarily based on how the specific risks of the 
project are shared. These frameworks can be useful for policy formulation in that they can 
help to avoid some problematic ways of formulating policies. 
Keywords: Procurement, Contract, Construction sector, Infrastructure projects 
Introduction 
Discussions about productivity problems and cost overruns are common in many countries. 
Changes in procurement have been proposed as ways to create incentives for innovation 
and for taking life-cycle cost into account (Mandell & Nilsson 2010). These changes involve 
moving from Design-Bid-Build (DBB) contracts to Design-Build (DB) contracts, and/or to 
contracts in which construction and maintenance are bundled, such as in Public Private 
Partnership (PPP). 
A survey done by Eriksson and Laan (2007) shows that for the majority of projects procured 
as DBB contracts, the clients and their consultants make the detailed design together. In 
these cases, it is possible for the design to be handled in-house if clients use their own staff 
(SOU 2009:24). On the other hand, in a typical DB contract the client specifies the general 
characteristics of the end product. This can theoretically be done in a number of ways, such 
as: by referring to earlier products (‘we want a standard type of this’); by specifying the 
general characteristics of the house (‘we want a residential building in seven floors with x 
square metres and fulfilling basic legal quality demands’); or by specifying various functional 
characteristics of the object (e.g., Bejrum & Grennberg 2003; Mattsson & Lind 2009). The 
fundamental difference between DBB contracts and DB contracts is who has the 
responsibility for the detailed design; in the first, the responsibility lies with the client, while in 
the second, the responsibility lies with the contractor. However, in both cases, the client 
typically has the responsibility for the operation and maintenance phases. In the construction 
of some projects, such as PPP projects, operation and maintenance is bundled to one 
contract (Leiringer 2003; Lind & Borg 2010). It is argued that this kind of contract (both DB 
contracts and PPP) gives the contractor a higher degree of freedom and the ability to use 
new solutions to cut costs and resources (Ng & Wong 2007). 
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The starting point for this paper is the belief that logical and clear terminologies and clearly 
structured arguments are important in a number of contexts. Clients have to make decisions 
about how to procure projects and if the alternatives are described in a vague and 
unsystematic way, then there is a risk for incorrect decisions, and the optimal procurement 
contract is not chosen. The framework determines how we formulate the alternatives and 
how we think about an issue. Clarity and logic are also important from a scientific 
perspective. If you want to compare and evaluate procurement contracts and find out their 
advantages and disadvantages, it is important that the alternatives are described in a logical 
and clear terminology. Otherwise we will not know what has been compared and what 
characteristics of the contract are responsible for the observed consequences. Without well-
structured and clear alternatives it will be difficult to draw policy implications from research.    
Our aim is to present a new and simple framework for describing and analysing alternative 
procurement and payment systems. As shown below, the definitions in leading textbooks 
lack consistency. In this article, we focus on contracts for infrastructure projects, such as 
roads and railways, which typically have a public client. This is a conceptual paper based on 
a selective sample of literature. The books we discuss here were chosen because they are 
leading textbooks in construction management1. The structure of the paper is as follows. In 
the next section, we examine how contracts and payment forms are described and 
categorised in leading textbooks (Gould & Joyce 2011; Ritz & Levy 2013; Winch 2010). Then 
we present our proposed framework, followed by some general reflections about the choice 
of procurement contract and payment methods. In the subsequent section, we present 
reflections on the choice of contract type and payment mechanism. In the final section, we 
present our general conclusions and the advantages of the proposed framework will be 
clarified. 
How Contracts are Structured in Selected Literature 
It is common in the selected literature to start with a rather long list of procurement contract 
types without a clear system: DBB contracts, DB contracts, performance-based contracts, 
PPP contracts and more. Each contract is seen as a unique entity with specific 
characteristics. Types of contracts are often graded in terms of additional commitment for 
the contractor. Secondly, the selected literature contains no common terminology for the 
whole problem at hand. American literature primarily uses the term Project Delivery Method 
(see Gould & Joyce 2011; FHWA n.d.) while Winch (2010) uses the term ways of procuring. 
Ritz and Levy (2013) use the term contract executing approach. 
Contract type refers to payment method in Gould and Joyce (2011); but payment method is 
called Contract format in Ritz and Levy (2013). In Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) 
publications, Procurement Method refers to the selection criteria used when choosing a 
contractor (FHWA n.d.), which are called Ways of procuring in Winch (2010). 
We recommend using the basic terminology Procurement contract type and Payment 
method. The first term refers to how tasks are allocated between different actors, and the 
second term refers to how the contractor is paid. 
Procurement Contract Type 
The tables below, and the comments after the tables, summarise how procurement contract 
types are structured in different sources. We first look at Gould and Joyce (2011), as shown 
in Table 1. In the text, Gould and Joyce (2011) also discuss: 
• Concession contracting (p. 34) including DBFO (Design-Build-Finance-Operate) and 
BOOT (Build-Own-Operate-Transfer); and 
                                               
1 Based on interviews with Swedish lecturers in the area.  
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• Innovation in project delivery (p. 91), where they mention PPP as a way to finance 
and give BOO (Build-Own-Operate), DBO (Design-Build-Operate), and DBF (Design-
Build-Finance) as further examples. 
 
Table 1: Contracts structure in Gould and Joyce (2011, Ch. 4) 
Name of contract type Description 
Design-Bid-Build The client hires a designer (architect), who prepares a design and completes 
contract documents. With correct documents, the client either conducts a 
bidding process or negotiates with a specific contractor. The contractor is 
then responsible for constructing and delivering a complete project. Both the 
architect and the contractor have the option of choosing subcontractors. The 
contractor is solely responsible for the execution of the work. 
Design-Build The client hires a firm, that is, a contractor that will perform both design and 
construction. The contractor has the option of hiring subcontractors and 
architects for the design.  
Construction 
Management 
The client hires both a construction management firm and a designer 
(architect) and has the sole responsibility of hiring individual construction 
contractors. The construction manager can vary in expertise and can be put 
in place at different stages. The architect is free to hire subcontractors. 
Table 2 describes the structure presented in Winch (2010), who uses the term formation of 
the project coalition. Winch (2010) also discusses four basic types of privately financed 
procurements (p. 43): Concession, Private Finance Initiative, Public Private Partnerships, 
and Company Limited with Guarantee. 
 
Table 2: Contract structure in Winch (2010, Ch. 5) 
Name of contract type Description 
Separated The client hires suppliers and (designer) architects and uses competitive 
tendering to obtain subcontractors. The architect is then responsible for 
selecting the trade contractors who will execute the site work. The architect 
is responsible for co-ordinating the contractors, but is not responsible for any 
failings on their part. One version involves the client hiring a general 
contractor that takes over the responsibility of the execution of the project 
on-site.  
Integrated (Turnkey) The client hires a single contractor for both the design and construction 
stages on a competitive tender basis. 
Mediated (construction 
project manager) 
The client hires architects, as well as a construction manager who is 
responsible for managing the trade contractors on site. The contractors are 
selected on the basis of a competitive tender organised by the construction 
manager. The arrangements and terminology vary considerably depending 
on the clients’ or the construction managers’ different responsibilities at 
various stages.  
Unmediated The client has a high level of in-house project management capability, and 
has the necessary knowledge for and option of hiring subcontractors. 
Table 3 presents the contract structure in Ritz and Levy (2013). In the text, Ritz and Levy 
(2013, p. 51) also mention Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) as another alternative. The FHWA 
(n.d.) presents the structure outlined in Table 4. 
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Table 3: Contract structure in Ritz and Levy (2013, Ch. 2) 
Name of contract type Description 
Traditional  The client hires a separate designer and a single general contractor that 
both have the option of hiring subcontractors.  
Turnkey The client has two options. The first option is design-build, where a single 
engineering contractor has the responsibility for both the design and 
construction. The general contractors hired by the engineering contractor 
have the option of either hiring subcontractors or using their own workforces.  
In the second option, the client hires an engineering construction manager 
with the responsibility for the design and construction, who in turn hires a 
designer and a construction manager who have the responsibility for the 
construction and for possible subcontractors. 
Owner Builder The client is responsible for design and construction and has the option of 
either using in-house competence or hiring subcontractors.  
Construction 
Management 
The client has two options: first, hiring a separate designer and a general 
contractor that acts both as a construction manager and as the client’s 
agent, with both designer and contractor having their own hired 
subcontractors; or second, hiring a designer, a construction manager that 
acts as the client´s agent, and individual construction contractors.  
 
Table 4: Contract structure in FHWA (n.d.) 
Name of contract type Description 
Design-Bid-Build The client hires separately for design and construction services, and keeps a 
high level of both control and risk. The contractor’s involvement is restricted 
to the construction phase. The client completely defines the scope.  
Design-Build The client combines design and construction under a single contract. The 
contract can also cover design-build-maintain, design-build-warranty and 
design-build-operate. The owner has the option of defining a scope of work, 
but has opportunity for innovation. This type of contract is often used for 
projects that are complex in nature or have a high level of urgency. The 
contractor’s involvement runs from just after the pre-design and ends at 
least after the warranty have expired.  
Construction 
Management 
The client hires a construction manager to act as a construction advisor 
during the pre-construction phase and as a general contractor during the 
construction. This contract transfers the cost and risk to the construction 
manager. The client has control over the scope and design during the 
process. The contractor’s involvement runs from just after the pre-design 
and ends when the warranty has expired.  
Public Private Partnership 
(PPP) 
The client hires a developer who takes part in the financing of the project in 
return for the ability to collect toll revenues, or to pursue development rights. 
The developer is responsible for the integrated delivery of design, 
construction, and operation and maintenance for a time period specified in 
advance.  
Alliance contracting/ 
Integrated project delivery 
(IPD) 
The client and at least one service provider, such as constructors, 
consultants, and designers, collaborate on the delivery of a project. The 
client collaborates with the industry to allocate risk.  
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It can be seen that three of the procurement contract types are repeated in several of the 
classifications. Design-Bid-Build is explicitly present in two of the four classifications, and 
appears to be the same as what is called Separated or Traditional in the remaining two. 
Design-Build is also present in two of the tables and is called Integrated or Turnkey in the 
other two. Construction Management is present in three of the tables. What Winch (2010) 
calls Unmediated seems to be similar to what Ritz and Levy (2013) call Owner Builder. 
Several of the books include some form of PPP as a fourth alternative, although others see 
PPP as being outside their classification system, and merely comment on it in their text. 
Payment Methods 
Concerning payment methods, Tables 5, 6 and 7 summarise the main alternatives, as 
described by the authors. Again, there is a lack of common structure in these classifications, 
even though some forms are repeated a number of times. Fixed price is mentioned by all 
three classifications, and Cost-plus and Unit price contracts are mentioned by two. In 
addition, there appears to be no common structure in how alternatives are presented.  
 
Table 5:  Payment method structure in Gould & Joyce (2011, Ch. 4) 
Name of payment method Description 
Single fixed price Also called lump sum, this is a contract in which the contractor has 
agreed to deliver a specified amount of work for a specific sum of money. 
Once the contract is signed, both parties have to live with the terms.  
Unit price contract The client and contractors agree on the price that will be charged per unit 
for the major elements. The client often provides estimated quantities, 
and the contractor calculates the final price according to this information, 
with additions for the contractors’ overhead, profit, and other project 
expenses. The final contract price is not known until the final work has 
been done.  
Cost plus a fee This is a contract in which the contractor is reimbursed by the client for 
all work costs, and also receives an additional agreed-upon fee, or a fee 
that is a percentage of the costs.  
 
Table 6: Payment method structure in Winch (2010, Ch. 6)  
Name of payment method Description 
Fee based This cost-reimbursable contract also seems to cover a unit price 
contract.  
Incentive contract This can be both a fee based and a lump sum contract, and varies in 
outline. The consistent part of this type of contract is the attempt to 
have positive incentives within the contract, to motivate performance 
fulfilment by gainsharing between parties.  
Fixed price A contract in which the price is fixed for an agreed-on amount of work. 
It may be that the contractor’s price is fixed, or it may be an after-
measurement, if the quantity of work to be done is not known in 
advance.  
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Table 7: Payment method structure in Ritz and Levy (2013, Ch. 2)2 
Name of payment method Description 
Cost-plus (a number of 
versions)3 
The client agrees to pay the contractors for the cost of the work plus a 
fee, very often calculated as a percentage of the cost. This contract 
can be complemented with a guaranteed maximum, a guaranteed 
maximum and incentive, or a guaranteed maximum and provision for 
escalation.  
Bonus (a number of versions) The bonus in this type of contract may be related, for example, to 
time, completion, and/or performance. 
Lump sum (a number of 
versions) 
A contract in which contractors prepare their bids according to a 
completed set of plans and specifications. No more and no less than 
is stipulated in the documents should be included.  
Unit price contracts The client and contractors agree on the price that will be charged per 
unit for the major elements. The client often provides estimated 
quantities, and the contractor calculates the final price according to 
this information, with additions for the contractors’ overhead, profit, 
and other project expenses. The final contract price is not known until 
the final work has been done.  
 
The Proposed Basic Framework: Procurement Contract Type 
We believe that similarities and differences between procurement contract types become 
clearer if a stepwise procedure is used; that is, a structure in which one dimension is 
introduced at a time. The following framework is based on three steps: determining what is 
to be procured; determining who will do the design; and determining how many contractors 
will be used. 
 
Step 1: What Is to Be Procured; Construction Only, or Construction with 
Operating/Maintenance? 
It is confusing that, especially in the FHWA (n.d.) framework, ‘delivery methods’ do not 
concern different ways of ‘delivering’ the same type of object. In addition, the composition of 
the object differs between methods. In one method, ‘delivery methods’ only concern a 
‘premise’ - for example, a road or a tunnel - while in another method, they concern both 
building an object and operating/maintaining it for a considerable number of years. 
In our proposed framework, the first step for the client is to decide whether a contract that 
delivers an object should be chosen, or whether a bundled contract that includes both 
construction and operation/maintenance should be chosen. The descriptions above show 
that PPP and BOT projects are not integrated in their basic framework. Instead, these types 
of contracts are mentioned in the text without a clear relation to their basic framework. Here, 
they are integrated in the same framework as traditional contracts that only concern a 
premise. Figure 1 illustrates this first step.  
                                               
2 They also discuss convertible contracts used in joint ventures, which is not relevant here. 
3 Here we also include what they call Time and materials. 
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Figure 1: Initial decision when producing a contract in the infrastructure sector (Source: 
authors) 
 
Step 2, Version 1: Who Will Do the Design?  
The line drawn between DBB and DB contracts concerns who is responsible for the detailed 
designs of the facility. The same distinction is drawn between what Winch (2010) calls 
Separated versus Integrated contracts, and what Ritz and Levy (2013) call Traditional versus 
Turnkey contracts. In the first type of contract, the detailed design is the client’s 
responsibility. In the second type, the detailed design is the contractor’s task. This distinction 
is illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2: Step 2, Version 1: Who will do the design? (Source: authors) 
 
In the literature, the distinction related to who makes the design is only used for pure 
construction contracts. However, the same distinction can be made for bundled contracts 
also. The client may have a clear view of exactly the kind of facility they want and how it 
should be managed, but may still write a bundled contract. The study presented by Borg 
(2011) indicates that in the (few) Swedish PPP projects that have been carried out, there 
was very little innovation. To a large extent, the contractor in these cases used techniques 
that the client had used earlier in DBB contracts. The choice of bundling construction and 
operation/maintenance can be motivated by arguments other than giving the contractor 
freedom concerning the design. For example, efficiency in the operation of the facility can 
motivate a bundled contract. Combining Figure 1 and Figure 2 therefore gives four basic 
options; however, as we argue in the next section, the real world options do not fit neatly into 
this framework. 
Step 2, Version 2: Who Will Do the Design? 
Nyström, Lind and Nilsson (2014) show that one cannot assume that a so-called ‘DBB 
contract’ has fewer degrees of freedom for the client than a so-called ‘DB contract’. They 
also make it clear that most DB contracts include detailed technical specifications 
concerning a number of aspects of the premises. In order to simplify repairs or the handling 
of spare parts, the client might have very specific demands concerning some components, 
while leaving other things open. In practice, the responsibility for the detailed design is 
divided between the client and the contractor. It is therefore more correct to talk about a 
Only construction Construction and 
operation/maintenance 
Client responsible 
for design 
 
Contractor responsible 
for design 
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continuum of contract forms than to talk about just two alternatives (i.e., the client versus the 
contractor being responsible for the design). This continuum is illustrated in Figure 3, with an 
arc between the two extreme points. In one extreme, the client makes detailed design 
choices for all components; in the other extreme, the client only formulates rather general 
functional demands (e.g., the capacity of a road, maximum track depths). Each point on the 
arc represents a specific division of responsibilities for the detailed design. 
 
Figure 3: Step 2, Version 2: Who will do the design? (Source: authors) 
 
If the client is responsible for design decisions, the framework contains a further subdivision 
concerning whether the design department is in-house, or whether independent consultancy 
firms are contracted for the design work. For example, the Swedish Transport Authority 
(STA) has gone from an in-house design department to almost complete outsourcing over 
the last fifteen years. This subdivision could be added to as ‘step 2b’ in the diagram. We do 
not include it here, in order to avoid unnecessary complexity in Figure 3. 
External or In-house Project Manager: Construction Management 
In the American literature in particular, Construction Management (CM) is described as one 
of the basic procurement strategies. In Sweden this is not seen as a specific ‘delivery 
method’ or contract form for infrastructure procurement (Eriksson & Hane 2014), but as a 
more pragmatic issue of whether to have an in-house project manager or whether to hire an 
external project manager. The STA, for example, sometimes uses a combination of CM and 
both external and internal project managers within the same project.  
In the literature, CM is sometimes described as having a role in which the construction 
manager is almost the same as a contractor. The construction manager is described as 
being responsible to the client, and the construction manager hires subcontractors. Large 
contractors in Sweden, such as Skanska, PEAB, and NCC, currently describe themselves as 
CM companies, because they use subcontractors to a large extent. In this way, these 
contractors can reduce their fixed costs and risks. The comparative advantage for the 
company is being able to put together the right team of companies for a specific task. 
In our proposed framework, CM is for these reasons not seen as a specific procurement 
contract type. How the contractor structures their work is up to them, and is not part of the 
procurement contract type. 
Step 3: How Many Contractors Will Be Used? 
In the models discussed above, it has been assumed that there is only one ‘general’ 
contractor, but this is of course not necessary. In the literature, there were models like the 
one Winch (2010) calls Unmediated or what Ritz and Levy (2013) call Owner Builder, in 
which the client hires several contractors to carry out specific tasks. Our framework therefore 
includes a continuous scale concerning the number of subcontractors: from one general 
contractor to a large number of separate subcontractors. This scale is shown in Figure 4.  
Client responsible 
for all design 
decisions 
 
Client only formulates 
general functional 
demands 
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It is important to note that a divided model with several subcontractors is also possible in a 
case where both construction and maintenance are included in the contract. In this case, 
using a number of contractors means that each one is responsible for a set of components 
of, for example, the road being constructed. For example, one company might be 
responsible for building and maintaining electronic information systems in a tunnel, while 
another might be responsible for the road in the tunnel. Even if it is typical for a PPP project 
to have one (general) contractor, this is not theoretically necessary. 
Partnering 
As described in Nyström (2005) and Eriksson (2010), partnering can be given a number of 
more specific interpretations. Their view, and ours, is that partnering should be seen as a 
way to carry out a certain project in a more collaborative way, opening up for adjustments 
during the project. This means that partnering should not be seen as a specific procurement 
contract type, but as something that can be implemented in any type of procurement 
contract. 
The Complete Proposed Framework 
Figure 4 shows all the different dimensions of our proposed framework. The idea is that a 
specific procurement contract could be seen as a specific point on this diagram. Notice that, 
for the second and third steps in the diagram, there are choices along continuums. The 
continuum in the second step is between the client being responsible for the entire design; 
and the contractor being responsible for the entire design, with the client only formulating 
general demands. The continuum in the third step is between there being one or many 
contractors.  
 
Figure 4: The complete proposed framework (Source: authors) 
 
The Proposed Basic Framework: Payment Method 
We propose that payment methods be divided into two main categories depending on 
whether there is any project-specific risk sharing or not. It can be argued that bonuses in 
relation to completion time and higher quality can be introduced into all payment methods; 
therefore, we discuss bonuses separately. Here, we only include payments where the public 
client pays the contractor. We will not discuss the risk of the client not paying according to 
the contract, since that can happen in any type of contract. For a PPP project, payment 
Only construction Construction and 
operation/maintenance 
Client 
responsible for 
all design 
  
Client only formulates 
general functional 
demands 
  
Client only formulates 
general functional 
demands 
  
Client 
responsible for 
all design 
  
 
One contractor Several contractors Several contractors 
  
One contractor 
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methods are also possible in which the user pays for the use of a road/rail; but we will not 
discuss these methods here. However, we include a discussion of some special issues that 
occur in contracts in which construction and maintenance is integrated. 
No Project-Specific Risk Sharing 
Here there are at least three subgroups: 
1. Fixed price: All risk is borne by the contractor/contractors. 
2. Fixed price with general indexing (e.g. consumer price index, or a general 
construction price index): All risk except changes in the general price level is borne 
by the contractor. 
3. Cost-plus contracts: All risk is borne by the client.  
Project-Specific Risk Sharing 
The cost of a project depends on prices for various inputs, and on how much of each 
different factor of production is needed (see Brunes & Lind 2014). Especially in more 
complex projects, there are uncertainties in both dimensions; and there are various ways of 
sharing these risks. 
• Unit price contracts: In this case, the prices for different types of work are fixed in the 
contract. For at least some dimensions, there are ‘variable quantities’, which means 
that the contractor is paid according to the actual quantities, but using the agreed 
price per unit. This means that the risk related to the prices is born by the contractor 
(unless prices are correlated with a general index), while the risk related to the 
quantities needed is borne by the client. 
• Sharing in cost increases/cost reductions (Cost sharing): In this case, the basic idea 
is that there is an ‘agreed price’, but if the actual cost is higher than this price, a 
certain share of the increased cost is paid by the client. If the actual cost is below the 
agreed price, then the price paid by the client is reduced by a certain share of this 
saving. This means that both price and quantity risks are shared. 
Bundled Contracts with Construction and Operation/Maintenance: A Special Issue 
These bundled contracts typically cover a 10-30 year period, opening up at least one extra 
issue concerning the payment method. Should the client pay only a yearly fee - covering 
both capital costs and operating costs? Or should the client pay a combination of an ‘up-
front’ payment and a yearly fee - the up-front payment when the premise is ready for use 
(which can be seen as covering the investment cost), and the yearly fee for operation and 
maintenance? This second model was, for example, used in one of the first road projects of 
this type in Sweden (Norrortsleden). There appear to be at least two arguments for the 
second model. The first argument is that this payment method fits better into the government 
budget system, if the government has a traditional investment budget. The second argument 
is that if the financing cost for the government is lower, then the total cost will be reduced if a 
certain sum is paid by the government when construction is finished.  
Bonuses and Penalties in Relation to Time and Quality 
All contracts specify what the contractor should deliver. In all contracts, it is possible to add 
bonuses and penalties if the contractor delivers something that is better or worse than what 
was agreed on in the contract. The simplest versions of bonuses and penalties relate to 
project completion. However, other measurable indicators can also be used as a basis for 
bonuses and penalties related to quality. In some cases, it may be more rational to make the 
contractor pay a penalty rather than having to redo work to reach the desired quality; 
however, we will not discuss this option further here. Bonuses and penalties for construction 
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contracts may also relate to the guarantee period. These and other bonuses and penalties 
may also relate to contracted quality, both during the contract period and, for integrated 
contracts, at the end of the contract period. How the contract handles bonuses and penalties 
is a complex issue that requires special study. 
Payment Methods in Relation to Selected Literature 
Our proposed framework covers the different payment methods presented in the literature 
review that we outlined earlier. What we call Fixed price in our framework covers what Gould 
and Joyce (2011) call Single fixed price; what Winch (2010) calls Fixed price; and what Ritz 
and Levy (2013) call Lump sum.  
Gould and Joyce (2011) further mention Unit price contracts and Cost plus a fee contracts 
which are included above. The Fee based contract in Winch (2010) is similar to the Cost 
plus contract, and his incentive contract covers both what we refer to as Cost sharing and 
the various bonus systems mentioned above. Ritz and Levy (2013) further mention Cost-
plus and Bonus contracts, which are covered by our categories above.  
Reflections on the Choice of Contract Type and Payment Mechanism 
Potential Problems 
From a theoretical perspective, it is clear that all models contain potential problems: 
• Integrating construction and maintenance has potential advantages in terms of 
creating incentives for minimising life-cycle costs. On the other hand, integrating 
construction and maintenance tends to reduce competition; and it is always difficult to 
write long-term contracts (e.g. Lind & Borg 2010). 
• Leaving the detailed design to the contractor opens up new solutions, and makes it 
easier to adapt the design to the skills of the contractor. On the other hand, giving the 
contractor an increased degree of freedom also increases the risk of moral hazard. In 
addition, it increases the chance of solutions that minimise the short-term cost of the 
contractor (see Nyström, Lind and Nilsson 2014; Borg 2011). This creates a problem 
because a risk-averse contractor tends to choose traditional established solutions 
that might reduce the rate of innovation (Borg 2011). 
• Using a general contractor reduces the transaction costs and the risk for the client. 
On the other hand, this model also reduces competition; and transferring risk to 
another party always comes with a cost. 
In the same way, all payment methods contain potential difficulties: 
• Putting all the risk on the contractor can reduce competition, and can be costly if the 
contractors are risk-averse. 
• If a price index is used, it leads to the issue of choosing the right index. In some 
cases, indexing can create new uncertainties, because the effect of the index is 
unsure; for example, when different prices change in different directions. 
• A cost-plus model that puts all the risk on the client reduces incentives for the 
contractor. 
• Unit price contracts can open up strategic bidding, if contractors think that the actual 
quantities will differ from the quantities listed in the procurement documents (e.g. 
Mandell & Nyström 2013; Skitmore & Cattell 2013). 
• Sharing divergences from an agreed price makes it necessary to measure the actual 
cost, which can be difficult. Risk sharing contracts also reduce incentives for the 
contractor. 
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• Bonuses that are related to certain specific parameters (e.g. completion on time) may 
lead to reduced quality in other dimensions, as the contractor focuses on dimensions 
that lead to a bonus (Milgrom & Roberts 1992, Ch. 7). 
How deterministic are the relations? 
Given the complexities discussed above, a reasonable research strategy would be to find 
relationships of the following type: ‘In situation X, contract type Y is the best’ (e.g. Eriksson & 
Hane 2014). Warsame, Borg and Lind (2013) however, question whether finding such 
relationships is really possible. How a certain model works in a specific situation depends on 
the skill and experience of the parties involved. If an actor believes in ‘model A’ and is aware 
of the potential problems in this model, it might be possible for that actor to take measures to 
control these problems and therefore get good results from ‘model A’. A different actor who 
believes in ‘model B’ might instead make that model work well in the same situation. A client 
who has had problems with one model might choose to change to another just to get a new 
start. 
Conclusion 
The main contribution of this paper to the existing body of research is our proposed 
framework for classifying contract types and payment methods. This has advantages in at 
least three different contexts. 
The first advantage of a logical classification system is that it helps the client to make the 
right decisions. Here are some examples of how our frameworks can be helpful for the 
decision maker: 
• Instead of initially think in terms of a number of contract types (DBB, DB, and PPP) 
and a choice between them, the framework points out that the first step is to decide 
what is to be procured. Should the contract only include construction, or should it 
include both construction and operation/maintenance? 
• The next step is to think in terms of: ‘Who will do the detailed design of the premise?’ 
Our framework makes it clear that this is not an either/or decision, but rather 
continuums of alternatives, and that it is rational for a client to regulate certain things 
in detail, while leaving other things to the contractor. 
• The final step in our framework is then to analyse the optimal structure of the 
contractor side. How many contractors will the client use? Should it be one general 
contractor or should the responsibilities be divided in one way or the other? 
• The framework concerning payment methods also starts from what we believe are 
the fundamental issues: How should various risks be divided? How should incentives 
for good behaviour be created? Instead of starting with a long list of different 
payment methods, the proposed framework pushes the decision maker to start by 
thinking about the underlying basic issues concerning risk and incentives. 
The second context where our framework can be useful is for structuring scientific 
investigations. Nyström, Lind and Nilsson (2014) present results from a number of 
evaluations of the effects of using DB contracts instead of DBB contracts. The conclusion is 
that no pattern can be found. Given our framework, that is not surprising as there is no clear 
line between DB contract and DBB contracts. When there in reality is a continuum of 
alternatives for allocating the task of making the detailed design, it might as well be the case 
that the line is drawn in different ways in different organisations or for different project. This 
means that what in one case is called a DBB contract may be similar to what in another case 
is called a DB contract. Then it is not surprising that no significant difference in outcome can 
be found. In order to make interesting evaluations, it is necessary to go into details of the 
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projects compared, to really find projects where there were large differences between how 
the design was made, and then compare the effects of these differences. 
Finally our framework can be useful for policy formulation, or at least a help to avoid some 
problematic ways of formulating policies. In recent years, one goal for the Swedish Transport 
Administration (STA) has been to increase the rate of innovation in infrastructure projects. 
This has in turn led to a measurable goal that the share of DB projects should be increased 
at a certain rate. The framework above indicates that this is not a good way to formulate a 
goal that is to be used to evaluate how successful the administration has been. As, 
according to our framework, there is no clear line between DBB projects and DB projects, a 
risk with formulating a goal in this way is that the STA simply re-labels their contracts without 
making any real changes in the contracts. Our framework can be used to formulate more 
precise goals, for example in terms of more projects where construction and 
operation/maintenance is integrated, and more projects where specific parts of the detailed 
design are left to the contractor/contractors. 
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